Human Rights in the New Millennium
International politics and foreign policy in the new millennium have witnessed a greater degree of human rights consciousness. Even the longstanding norm of sovereignty is evolving towards one of a more 'contingent' nature due to multiple factors, among which high- 25 profile interventions intended to promote human rights play a key role.
1 Concerns about human rights are manifested particularly in the official US Department of State website. 2 Furthermore, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour claims that 'the United States uses a wide range of tools to advance a freedom agenda, including bilateral diplomacy, multilateral engagement, foreign assistance, reporting and public outreach, and In focusing on the effects emanating from a wide range of foreign policy actions, this study constitutes a step forward with regard to large-scale data analyses. Indeed, the central conclusion of literature on the subject is that US actions reflect the intent to protect human rights, but only if strategic interests are not affected, and not always even then. 
Evidence Regarding US Actions and Human Rights Abroad
This section is organized around the economic and military tools of foreign policy that the US uses. 8 Threats and punishments, along with promises and rewards, are considered in each instance. Other measures, such as bilateral diplomacy and multilateral engagement, are beyond the scope of the review because it is concerned with direct statements or actions 10 by the US government rather than negotiations of one kind or another. As will become apparent, the tools of foreign policy tend to be assessed in isolation from each other in existing research designs.
Military Intervention
To begin, consider the outcomes of six cases of US military deployments from the adminis- 15 trations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, characterized as humanitarian interventions. Results are mixed-encouraging in some cases (Northern Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia), at least in the short-term, but not in others (Somalia and Kosovo). 9 Thus the degree of success appears to be a function of specific circumstances on the ground and tactics pursued by the US, either alone or in conjunction with others.
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Pickering and Peceny focus on the impact on democracy in target states of interventions from the US, UK, France, and the UN. 10 Although not precisely on the topic of human rights, their theorizing and results regarding intervention are sufficiently important to be included in this review. The study investigates whether US interventions are different from those of other liberal powers vis-a-vis promotion of democracy via force. A time series 25 cross-sectional data analysis is implemented for the period . ' The strong statistical relationship between hostile US military intervention and political liberalization and democratization', observe Pickering and Peceny, 11 'seems to be the result of three cases of in the context of monitoring end-use in relation to human rights. 18 With a focus on the Persian Gulf, the GAO report concludes that 'implementation gaps' limit the effectiveness of end-use monitoring and human rights vetting in relation to military equipment. Bahrain, for example, may have used US-provided equipment to 'quell protests', and the report 5 expresses concerns that this problem might exist in other Gulf states as well.
Most current among studies of military assistance and human rights is that of Sandholtz, which investigates the era of the 'War on Terror'.
19 Data analyses for more than 100 states reveal that the relationship between human rights performance in recipient countries and US military assistance significantly deteriorated after 9/11. The likely mechanism 10 at work is perverse in nature. In light of the US's eagerness to recruit and obtain supporters in the War on Terror, cooperative states may have perceived military assistance from Washington as including the go-ahead to carry out even more repression. According to one observer, US security policy after 9/11 has tended to 'exacerbate rather than attenuate the root causes of terrorism, especially in the Middle East', because it pro-15 vides terrorist groups with a pretext for retaliation against US military action. 20 With regard specifically to US human rights policy, critics tend to hold sway; for example, Donnelly and Liang-Fenton see Washington as reactive and short-term in its thinking.
21
Intervention, moreover, needs to become less US-centric and more in tune with local conditions. Iraq provides, perhaps, the most dramatic support for that argument, given that it be-20 came obvious soon after the short conventional phase of the war that the leadership in Washington knew little about the country they had occupied.
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Economic Sanctions
With regard to economic threats and punishments, interest converges on the utility of sanctions. Yet, policy-oriented reflections on the record of sanctions turn out to be discourag-25 ing. Economic sanctions do not produce regime change, and entail certain potential and acknowledged disadvantages. 23 Suffering as a result of economic sanctions could contribute 
Deriving Hypotheses
Points that emerge from the preceding discussion about US foreign policy and human rights undergird the theorizing in this section:
• Whether the techniques are economic or military, the impact of US intervention is neutral at best and often harmful.
• The preceding assertion remains true whether US inducements take a positive or negative form, with sticks arguably worse than carrots.
• No policy tool works consistently to protect or promote human rights. 35 To the extent 20 that the US hopes to promote human rights abroad, it must accept the reality that local conditions are crucial, and tend to limit potentially successful cases.
Although not offered in connection with human rights, recent reflections on the direction of US foreign policy can provide the point of departure for theorizing in response to the preceding observations which, taken as a whole, argue against the respective forms of 25 action by the US if the goal is to promote human rights abroad. Consider the question, 'how much is enough?' vis-a-vis US intervention. Layne offers a critique that sees US involvement abroad as supraoptimal vis-a-vis its basic interests. 36 Moreover, the 'hyperactive' era of US foreign policy, arguably at its peak during the George W. Bush administration, goes back well beyond such soft targets for criticism as the 5 costly involvement in Iraq over the past decade. Thus, to preserve its position as the leading state, the US should match resource allocation more directly with the likelihood that a given conflict beyond its borders possesses implications for (i) preventing a dominant Eurasian power; and (ii) securing access to vital resources in the Middle East by working against a regional hegemon there as well. 37 
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What does all of this have to do with the promotion of human rights? Interesting to consider is the possibly more effective pursuit of a human rights policy within the traditional context of national interest, as articulated above via Layne. 38 Consider the case of Kosovo. 39 The US acted to stabilize a volatile region, and in doing so led The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in an effort that simultaneously counteracted a pol-15 icy of extermination put in place by Serb ultra-nationalists. US-led efforts in Kosovo had the effect of discouraging Russian aggrandizement in the region. Overall, the strategy of NATO bombing over a full-scale invasion was successful from the standpoint of national interests. Liberals also saw the outcome as a victory by virtue of the humanitarian relief it brought the people of Kosovo, and at least a temporary end to human rights abuses against Kosovar Albanians. From a US perspective, overextension will be associated with generally harmful outcomes, which include human rights. Moreover, as Yetiv puts it, inconsistency seems a likely result if the US takes the default position of reacting to developments rather than being more selective when considering the appropriate action. 40 From the viewpoint of states tar-25 geted in US's efforts to respond to all 'emergencies', harmful effects are anticipated from the leading state's supraoptimal level of activity. Perhaps O'Reilly's summation of US policy in the Persian Gulf as 'unexceptional'-that is, generally imperialistic-can be linked to not only the content but also sheer volume of action taken by Washington.
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Put differently, a more restrained foreign policy increases the likelihood of worldwide 30 evolution towards enhanced human rights as a result of eliminating or lessening the 'boomerang' effect of ill-conceived interventions. As demonstrated by the research reviewed in the previous section, whether in the form of carrots or sticks, US actions are associated with neutral or negative effects with regard to human rights protection abroad. Two causal mechanisms are reviewed in turn. One mechanism goes all the way back to Lasswell and the vision of a 'garrison state', into whose hands military specialists would increasingly concentrate power as a result of the perceived public need for ever-higher levels of national security. 42 By exerting pressure on admittedly odious regimes, the US unintentionally strengthens the hand of those already 5 engaged in human rights abuses. With an ability to cite a US threat to national security or sovereignty, abusive dictators can justify higher levels of repression. Thus the approach based on sticks is unlikely to produce an outcome favouring human rights. Efforts based on carrots are no more likely to succeed. The other causal mechanism regarding human rights concerns the effects of resource transfers, whether military or eco-10 nomic in nature. Economic aid and military assistance are alike in that they provide additional resources to rogue leaders already proven to disrespect human rights. As Callaway and Matthews observe, the US continues to grant 'extensive amounts of foreign aid to countries with poor human rights records in the name of national security'. 43 Intuition suggests that at least some of the resources transferred will find their way towards 15 coercive purposes-another dimension of the garrison state.
Put all of this together and consilience is at hand. Historical, interpretive arguments about national interest point in the same direction as data-based studies of US promotion of human rights. The idea of an 'ethical foreign policy', put forward by Callaway and Matthews, serves as a point of culmination for the preceding arguments: 'On the one hand 20 it is not useful and in fact is impractical to promote a policy that does not take into account security interests; however, a total disregard for the consequences of action taken in the name of national security is ethically reprehensible, and in practical terms does little to serve the very primary objective that the state pursues-security.' 44 The status quo, unfor- context, the results of Scott and Steele, who look at data from 1988 to 2001 and find that carefully targeted US democracy aid is associated more closely than generic economic assistance with democratization. 46 From the preceding analysis emerges a general hypothesis:
Hegemonic Intervention Hypothesis (HIH): Interventions abroad will have neutral or harmful effects on human rights practices.
Regardless of whether the foreign policy tool is economic or military, the impact of the leading state's intervention on human rights is anticipated to be neutral, if not harmful. Consider public opinion intertwined with the character of US activity abroad as a reinforc-10 ing factor. Successful US interventions are likely to be sustained and involve massive resources-and public approval for such ventures will be rare. Exceptions such as Germany and Japan after World War II come to mind, but as a general rule the public will frown upon such enormous allocations of resources as those to Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, relatively limited, although probably unsuccessful, ventures are more likely to occur be-15 cause they are above the bar for public approval.
One important qualifying point concerns intentions. The HIH does not imply that the US leadership is acting with ill intent-only that the results with respect to Washington's activities vis-a-vis human rights abuses abroad are anticipated to be disappointing. The matter of intentions carries over to the forms of US activity, which may have varying ef-20 fects. It is reasonable to infer that the types of actions will have different effects:
Coercion Hypothesis (CH): Military interventions and economic sanctions will have more harmful effects than military and economic assistance on human rights practices.
This proposition follows naturally from the content of the respective actions. While all four actions are intended to cause changes in behaviour on the part of the target regime, the 25 'carrots' are likely to do less harm than the 'sticks'. Intuition here is that at least some positive effects could transmit to the society in question from the two varieties of carrot, while the sticks are coercive and would seem to have no immediately positive collateral effects to balance off whatever harm is done.
Research Design
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In order to test the HIH and CH, this study assembles data on 144 countries during the period 1975-2005 (see Appendix A1 for a list of sample countries), so the country-year is the unit of analysis. Yet, all the countries may not have the same probability of provoking US actions. Since the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries engage in relatively low levels of human rights abuses, they are not likely 35 to become subjects on the US foreign policy agenda, at least for that reason. Accordingly, this study tests two samples: (i) all countries; and (ii) non-OECD countries. Because the estimated results from the two samples are similar, to save space this study discusses only the former. This study does not select a particular set of events that has sometimes precipitated US military actions; as Fordham notes, 'in principle, intervention requires no triggering 40 event. States can and do use force without provocation'. 47 The study period is determined rather that researchers identify more abuses than they did in the past. As such, empirical research using existing data should account for this temporal bias. However, when we employ Fariss's latent human rights protection scores, which effectively address the temporal bias over the course of years, the results are similar to those that we report in the ensuing section. Thus, these results are only briefly discussed along with Table 1 The CIRI physical integrity rights index captures the level of political repression in each state by combining the instances of torture, political imprisonment, extrajudicial killings, and disappearances. The combined scores range from '0' (no respect for any of these four rights) to '8' (full respect for all of them); however, this study reverses the order of the scores for an easy interpretation of estimated coefficients, thereby '0' corresponds to the 20 lowest repression and '8' corresponds to the highest repression. The PTS ranges from '1' (highest levels of human rights protection) to '5' (lowest levels of human rights protection). US Department of State (USDS) and Amnesty International (AI) scores produce very similar estimates and the empirical analysis reported below relies on the latter (i.e., as explained in Appendix A3) to save space.
US intervention. This study also tested a possibility of endogeneity bias, namely, that countries with human rights abuses are more likely to trigger US intervention, while US actions, particularly military intervention (e.g., the case of Iraq), can result in more abuses. Robustness tests are reported in Model 1 in Appendix A2, which (i) includes only those countries exposed to a risk of experiencing US military interventions; and (ii) assumes human rights violations and military interventions to be endogenous in instrumental variables (two-stage least squares) regression. The results are similar to those reported in the next section, so to save space they are not discussed in detail. Note also that the results are likely to be biased because the two-stage least squares regression assumed the endogenous variables are continuous when they are actually ordinal and count. There is no existing statistical software that can run a simultaneous equations model with ordinal and count variables, so this study relied on the 2SLS as an ad hoc estimation method. economic behaviour that the sanctioner deems inappropriate'. 58 Examples of economic sanctions include trade embargoes, restrictions on imports and exports, denial of foreign assistance (including loans and investments), freezing of foreign assets, and prohibition of economic transactions between multinational corporations and sanctioned countries.
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US military and economic assistance is foreign assistance in millions of US dollars that is reported by the recipient country. Any country that has received from the US government cumulative military or economic assistance amounting to more than $500,000 since 1945 is required to do such reporting. This study uses constant dollar amounts in 2009 that are inflation-adjusted values. To correct the highly positive skew in the amount of dollars, the 10 logarithm of military assistance or economic assistance is taken for estimation. 59 Data are garnered from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, informally known as the Greenbook.
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It is appropriate to control for other factors that might affect the magnitude of the expected relationship between US foreign policy actions and human rights conditions. From the existing record of research, five variables with a track record of performance are 15 included into the model: violent dissent, civil war, per capita income, population size, and democracy. 61 The effects for each follow intuition from prior studies. 62 A lagged term for human rights violations is not included as a control because Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Sul demonstrate that the control variable leads to Nickell bias when the number of countries far exceeds the number of periods. 63 Yet, even when it is added to the model specification, the main findings of this study remain the same. An example is shown in Model 8 in Appendix A6, where a lagged term for human rights violations is included-a replicated analysis of Davenport and Armstrong's study, but economic sanctions still appear to backfire. 64 Political dissent is measured by two different indicators: violent dissent (i.e., riots and 25 likely to use violence when under threat, so the violent dissent variable is included in the statistical model. This study also examines the possibility that, when facing an internal challenge from anti-government armed forces, leaders are more likely to use repressive measures to maintain civil order. Put differently, leaders are more likely to rely on repres-5 sion when civil war appears more than probable. To account for that issue, this study relies on the Uppsala and PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. A civil war is defined as a contested incompatibility between a government and one or more opposition groups which results in at least 25 battle deaths in a year. The civil war onset variable is coded as '1' when a new civil war occurs and also as '1' when no civil conflict occurred within the past two years.
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Per capita income and population are introduced in order to consider the main tenets of modernization theories. Countries where poverty and a high population are major issues are more likely to repress citizens in hopes of reducing high levels of socio-economic stress. Democracy should provide a favourable environment for the protection and effective realization of human rights.
67 Accordingly, as the quality of democratic governance increases, human rights violations should decrease. The democracy variable is taken from the Polity dataset. Polity provides an 11 point additive score for both democracies and autocra-20 cies to capture the overall quality of democratic political institutions. Each additive score ranges from 0 to 10. Subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score gives a composite score, ranging from '-10' (least democratic) to 'þ10' (most democratic).
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The dependent variable, state repression, is rank-ordered and ordinal, so this study employs an ordered logit model with robust standard errors, clustered on the country. When 25 an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression model is used instead, the estimated results coincide with those from ordered logit with respect to the level of significance and the coefficient sign, so in order to save space they are not reported below. Note that because the dependent variable is ordinal but not interval, taking the first difference of the ordinal measure (i.e. the change) is unsuitable for statistical estimation. To ensure that predictors 30 precede the outcome variable, this study takes one-and five-year lagged terms for foreign policy tools.
Empirical Results
Prior to multivariate logit analysis, consider the correlation matrix for the four key variables of interest: Military interventions, military assistance, economic sanctions, and economic as- 35 sistance. As shown in Appendix A4, the correlation between any two variables is not high enough to cause concern in the event they are included in the same model for estimation. In fact, the highest correlation turns out to be 0.45 between military assistance and economic assistance. It is important to note that 0.80 is a conventional threshold that causes concern. Each foreign policy tool in Models 1-4 is statistically significant and offers supporting evidence for the HIH: Whether they are military or economic, US interventions abroad are likely to lead to a worsening of human rights around the world. When military interventions are pitted against military assistance in Model 5, both variables remain statistically significant and the coefficient signs are positive. This implies that any military means may 15 exert an unfavourable effect on human rights protection. However, when the strength of the raw coefficients (i.e., log-odds) is compared upon standardization, it turns out that military assistance (0.147) is stronger in attenuating the status of human rights than military interventions (0.085).
72 When economic sanctions are compared with economic assistance in Model 6, the latter (0.371) appears to be more harmful to protection of human rights 20 than the former (0.252). When the four foreign policy tools are compared in Model 7, the strength of the coefficients is 0.062 (military intervention), 0.020 (military assistance), 0.252 (economic sanctions), and 0.357 (economic assistance). Of the four forms of foreign policy intervention, economic assistance appears to be the most catalytic cause of state repression as regards the magnitude of the four standardized coefficients calculated from 25 Model 7. This supports the notion that US economic assistance helps consolidate the regimes of dictators who then use the assistance to repress their own people. Given the rampant phenomenon of developmental dictatorship in countries where economic assistance 69 Ordered logistic regression is based on the proportional odds assumption. This study formally tested the assumption in two ways: a likelihood ratio test using a user-written Stata command called omodel and Brant test. Both of these tests indicate that the research design does not violate the proportional odds assumption. 70 Note that compared to the last model, the first seven models are parsimonious because they do not include control variables. Models with too many controls may be affected by statistical noise, whereas simpler models may capture the underlying causal relationship better and may show superior predictive performance. In fact, Clarke demonstrates mathematically that 'the inclusion of additional control variables may increase or decrease the bias, and we cannot know for sure which is the case in any particular situation'. Kevin Clarke, 'The Phantom Menace', Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 22, No. 4 (2005), p. 341. In short, Models 1 through 7 are introduced to evaluate the direct relationship between the main predictors and the outcome variable before checking the robustness of the main findings to the inclusion of other control variables as in Model 8. Of course, the inclusion of control variables is a conventional practice that aims to avoid omitted variable bias. 71 Fariss, 'Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time'. 72 The evaluation is based on comparison of the fully 'standardized' coefficients for the logged odds.
was used for both development and dictatorship (e.g., South Korea during the Park Chung Hee period (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) (1977) (1978) (1979) ), the finding is less of a surprise. Since Models 1-7 are built without considering control variables, they may be subject to omitted variable bias. Model 8 is designed to circumvent this issue by including five con-5 trols that have been identified as key determinants of human rights violations in the literature. 73 Incorporation of the control variables fails to cause military interventions and economic sanctions to become insignificant, while military assistance and economic assistance turn out to be insignificant. It appears that the former two tools of US foreign policy are linked to worsening human rights abuses around the world, while the latter two tools 10 have no bearing on human rights conditions once other factors are taken into account. These results support the HIH and the CH.
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In Model 9, we use Fariss's latent human rights protection scores to account for the possibility of temporal bias. 75 Note that because these scores record the protection, not abuse, of human rights, we expect a negative relationship between each foreign policy tool and 15 human rights. This means that when each tool of US foreign policy is implemented, we expect human rights protection to encroach. It appears that the results in Model 9 do not deviate from those in previous models. Military interventions and economic sanctions are detrimental to the promotion of human rights abroad, while neither military nor economic assistance exerts a significant effect.
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This study also obtains predicted probabilities, which are usually easier to interpret than the odds ratios. In order to examine how the probabilities of membership to each category of Human Rights Violations change, as in Model 8, this study varies one of the main predictors and holds the other variables at their means. For example, the predicted probability of being in the highest category of Human Rights Violation is 0.033 if the US does meddle 25 in the domestic affairs of other states; 0.087 if the US intervenes in the same state once; and 0.215 if the US dispatches its armed forces twice. Hence, if the US deploys its forces multiple times, the predicted probability of worsening human rights conditions increases.
One argument about US impact might be related to short-versus long-term assessment. The empirical models in Table 1 Table 2 includes the models that take into account the time effect over a five-year period. 76 Since the only coefficients of interest are the four tools related to US action, five lagged variables for each 73 When three sets of multicollinearity tests (i.e., variance inflation factors, condition index, and R 2 statistics) are conducted, this study finds no severe problems and the results are reported in Appendix A5. 74 Because military interventions and economic sanctions emerge as consistent predictors, it is interesting to see their interaction effect on the status of human rights violations. Model 2 in Appendix A2 displays the results. While each of the constitutive terms still remains significant, the interaction term turns out to be insignificant. This is not surprising given that the US relies on one of the foreign policy tools most of the time. For example, Washington has imposed economic sanctions on-but refrained from military assaults against-North Korea, Iran, and Russia for human rights violations. 75 Fariss, 'Respect for Human Rights Has Improved over Time'. 76 It might be argued that even a five-year lag is not enough to pick up the effects of sanctions intended to work over a very long time frame, such as those directed against human rights violations in South Africa or Cuba. However, when lagged terms for 10 years are included, foreign policy tool are incorporated in the model specification. It turns out that none of the lagged variables shows a negative sign when it is statistically significant. For example, although Model 8 includes control variables, none of the 20 lagged predictors achieves significance with a negative sign. The overall finding of Table 2 once again confirms the HIH,   5 which anticipates a neutral or even detrimental association of US intervention with human rights violations around the world. The results here also confirm the CH, if the focus is on the initial lag in particular: military intervention and economic sanctions maintain significance while military and economic assistance do not.
As another robustness test that assesses the effect of US actions on human rights viola-10 tions, this study now turns to the physical integrity rights variable. As noted, because the human rights literature frequently employs the physical integrity rights index, the alternate variable is introduced. Table 3 shows the results that are similar to those in Table 1 
Conclusion
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Can US foreign policy interventions be expected to help improve human rights conditions in other countries? This is an important question for scholars and policy-makers in the area of foreign policy; however, the literature has not compared different tools of US foreign policy in the same empirical model. This study has extended and synthesized existing theoretical arguments and then performed empirical tests regarding the effects of four distinctive 35 tools of US foreign policy. The ordered logit analysis has shown that both military and economic forms of intervention are likely to be hindrances to promotion of human rights abroad. Confirmed also is that whether US actions take a positive or negative form, the results abroad are indifferent or negative from a human rights point of view. All of the results support the HIH, while the more focused CH receives partial confirmation.
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This study suggests two causal mechanisms for more in-depth exploration. Positive actions, such as economic and military assistance, seem to aggravate (or leave unchanged) this study finds no evidence for long-run effects, especially after the fifth year. The results can be obtained from the authors upon request. 77 Their replication data can be found at https://quantoid.net/research. human rights practices. Oppressive governments are more likely, it would seem, to use foreign aid to enhance their coercive abilities rather than for purposes intended by US governments providing assistance. The other causal mechanism concerns unintended consequences from negative actions, such as economic sanctions and military intervention.
5
Rather than forcing pernicious regimes to improve their behaviour, leaders under pressure can be expected to redouble efforts to assert control over citizens in whatever way possible. In sum, both of the preceding causal mechanisms are candidates for process tracing through extended case studies.
Results from this study point towards the need to re-evaluate, in particular, the sheer 10 quantity of US activity around the globe. With aggregate findings in the present study that point away from success in the domain of human rights promotion, the question naturally arises as to whether it is both counter-productive and wasteful for the US to intervene so often-regardless of the intentions behind whatever Washington is doing in a given instance. The results here provide further affirmation for a US shift towards highly targeted, 15 context-sensitive intervention such as democracy assistance, for which favourable evidence already exists.
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Of course, this study does not claim that a foreign policy of limited balancing, with an emphasis on national interest, is necessarily more conducive to creating a favourable environment for human rights protection. Process tracing through case studies would be a logical Overall, the evidence suggests that the US's most commonly-used foreign policy tools end up doing more harm than good, so its direct involvement should be contemplated more carefully than ever in any given instance. In sum, the empirical results of this study remind 30 us of an old phrase: sometimes less is more.
78 See Scott and Steele, 'Sponsoring Democracy'.
Interestingly, the PTS relies on the same source materials as the physical integrity rights measures in the CIRI index and 'in most instances use of either dataset will result in the same or similar findings' (Wood and Gibney 2010: 395). A notable feature in the two data sets comes from the differences in the coding procedures. The CIRI index reports the combined scores for human rights violations by using the US Department of State's (USDS)
10
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices as the primary source and Amnesty International's (AI) Annual Report as a secondary source, while the PTS provides two different scores of human rights violations, one from the former source and the other from the latter source. Accordingly, the correlation between the two measures is highapproximately 0.79 between the USDS-based measure and the CIRI, and 0.75 between the 15 AI-based measure and the CIRI during the time period of this study. Nonetheless, Wood Note: *p < .05, ** p < .01, ***p < .001, two-tailed tests.
